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Tackling Chinese Upgrading Through  
Experimentalism and Pragmatism: The 
Case of China’s Wind Turbine Industry 
Julia Kirch KIRKEGAARD 
Abstract: This paper examines the development of China’s wind tur-
bine industry, shedding light on the Chinese mode of disruptive in-
dustrial upgrading through policy pragmatism and fragmented, experi-
mental governance. Based on a historical analysis of China’s wind 
turbine industry, the paper highlights three distinct phases, which are 
all marked by their own inbuilt and potentially self-disruptive im-
passes and associated crises. In turn, these impasses have forced the 
Chinese government into radical and flexible interventions, which 
have spurred on Chinese companies to creatively find new ways to 
develop and upgrade. The paper illustrates the transformation of 
Sino–foreign relations by China’s non-linear upgrading approach, 
particularly during the Chinese wind power industry’s quality crisis, 
and its development model. It also discusses the implications this 
examination of China’s approach has for the literatures on China, 
upgrading, and catch-up. Finally, the paper calls on future studies to 
enquire further into China’s distinct mode of industrial upgrading and 
its embeddedness in China’s institutional context. 
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Introduction 
Within the last decade, China has emerged as the world leader in 
wind power, shaking up old competitive relations in the global value 
chain of the wind turbine industry (GWEC 2016; Kirkegaard 2015; 
Lewis 2013; Korsnes 2014; Lema, Berger, and Schmitz 2013; Chen et 
al. 2014; Mathews and Tan 2015). In 2015 China boasted an astonish-
ing 33.6 per cent of global cumulative installations (GWEC 2016: 32). 
What is even more remarkable is the pace with which China has as-
cended within the global wind power scene. Following the influential 
2005 Renewable Energy Law, China’s installed wind power capacity 
grew from 0.8 gigawatts (GW) in 2004 to 145 GW in 2015 (GWEC 
2016: 4). Furthermore, Chinese wind turbine manufacturers are in-
creasingly becoming global lead firms. With China’s emergence as a 
major force in clean energy development and as a potential green 
“saviour” of the world (Mathews 2016; Mathews and Tan 2015; Liu 
and Liang 2013), we need to better understand China’s particular 
mode of clean energy upgrading and catch-up. 
This paper1 examines, on the one hand, how China – an authori-
tarian regime – has been able to upgrade and catch up in the field of 
wind power with such unprecedented pace and scale and, on the 
other hand, how and whether such rapid upscaling and upgrading has 
transformed Sino–foreign relations in the wind turbine industry. Pre-
vious research already sheds light on parts of this puzzle – for ex-
ample, pointing to the central role of transforming industrial trends 
of China’s integration into global value chains and global innovation 
networks (e.g. Silva and Klagge 2013; Chen et al. 2014; Lewis 2013; 
Lema, Berger, and Schmitz 2013), of innovative manufacturing 
(Nahm and Steinfeld 2014), and of the organisational decomposition 
of innovation processes (Lema, Haakonsson, and Kirkegaard forth-
coming) in China’s upgrading in Chinese wind power. Others have 
highlighted the institutional specificities and political embeddedness 
of Chinese wind power development by, for instance, pointing to 
favourable Chinese government policies (Kirkegaard 2015; Christen-
sen 2013; Lema and Ruby 2007) and China’s specific institutional 
conditions of decentralised fragmentation and centralised control 
together with policy experimentation and policy learning (Kirkegaard 

1 The author would like to thank the Sino–Danish Centre for Education and 
Research (SDC) in Beijing for its financial support. 
  The Case of China’s Wind Turbine Industry 9 

2015; Korsnes 2014), which have “been fundamental for policy flexi-
bility and institutional adaptability” in China’s wind turbine industry 
(Korsnes 2014: 175).  
Despite these valuable insights, I argue that a more fine-grained 
understanding of some of the defining institutional conditions of 
Chinese industrial upgrading is still needed to truly comprehend 
whether and how China’s mode of upgrading has changed the dy-
namics of Sino–foreign customer–supplier relations in China’s wind 
turbine industry. Rather than providing a linear account of upgrading 
that looks at chains and networks as relatively stable and undisputed 
structures, this paper offers a dynamic account of the co-evolving 
institutional context of simultaneous forces of control and experi-
mentation and the reconfiguration of Sino–foreign micro-level rela-
tions in the wind turbine industry. Such a dynamic, non-linear, and 
“multilevel” perspective has been lacking in the literature. Aiming to 
extend and refine Ang’s (2016) argument on China’s non-linear eco-
nomic development as a result of co-existing and complementary 
forces of “direction and improvisation” in Chinese governance (Ang 
2016: 69), this paper looks to answer the research question of whether 
and how China tackles upgrading through experimentalism and 
pragmatic governance, and whether and how this has had an impact 
on Sino–foreign customer–supplier relations in China’s wind turbine 
industry. This paper hypothesises that it is through “failures” and 
pragmatic experimentation that China has produced self-disruptive 
phases of impasse, which – somewhat paradoxically – have forced 
China to learn, upgrade, and “jump the ladder.”  
Founded on rich empirical data from China for the period 2011–
2016, the paper explores this issue through a case study on the histor-
ical development of Chinese wind power. The paper proceeds by first 
providing a brief overview of how upgrading and catch-up processes 
have been conceptualised in different streams of literature, focusing 
on the literature on upgrading within China’s wind power sector. 
Next, it discusses the data and the three-staged analysis method it 
employs to evaluate Chinese upgrading. It then examines China’s 
potentially unique non-linear upgrading (un)logic or what rather may 
be termed an upgrading trajectory with Chinese characteristics. Be-
fore concluding, it further discusses the advantages, disadvantages, 
possibilities, and tensions such an approach offers as well as how its 
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findings relate to the extant literature and other newly industrialised 
countries. 
Upgrading and the Role of China’s Institutional 
Context for Wind Power 
In the following I provide a brief review of the existing literature in 
order to set the context for this paper’s analysis of the development 
of China’s wind turbine industry. Specifically, I highlight industrial 
upgrading and technological catch-up and the institutional particulari-
ties of Chinese governance.  
Accounts of Industrial Upgrading in Chinese  
Manufacturing and Wind Power 
The economic geography literature – especially that which discusses 
global commodity chains (GCCs) (e.g. Bair 2005; Gereffi 1999), glob-
al value chains (GVCs) (e.g. Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; 
Lema, Berger, and Schmitz 2013), global production networks 
(GPNs) (e.g. Cooke 2013), and global innovation networks (GINs) 
(e.g. Ernst 2006; Parrilli, Nadvi, and Yeung 2013) – provides rich 
insights into how industries can upgrade through integration into 
global chains and networks of production and innovation. Upgrading 
has often been conceptualised as a somewhat linear movement in the 
GCC between assemblers, original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs), brand manufacturers, and design manufacturers (Gereffi 
1999: 51) or as a matter of process, product, functional, and chain- or 
inter-sectoral upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). The GIN 
framework looks at regional upgrading processes as a matter of “link-
ing up” with external resources and innovation systems – that is, as a 
matter of “strategic coupling” (Parrilli, Nadvi, and Yeung 2013: 970). 
Apart from shedding light on the enabling factor of integration into 
global chains and networks of production and innovation, the litera-
ture also examines barriers to upgrading – for example, constraining 
factors of hierarchical governance modes or the lack of technological 
capabilities of suppliers (e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Fu, Pie-
trobelli, and Soete 2011; Morrison, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti 2008). 
In particular, the GVC literature shows how the specific governance 
mode (i.e. the coordination of customer–supplier relations based on a 
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transaction–cost rationale) of a chain determines not only the process 
of adding and distributing value along the chain but also upgrading 
possibilities, barriers to upgrading, and thus the potential for trans-
formation and catch-up (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Gereffi, 
Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005: 83–84).  
Several related studies focus on Chinese upgrading within manu-
facturing in general (Steinfeld 2004; Ge and Fujimoto 2004; Brandt 
and Thun 2010; Herrigel, Wittke, and Voskamp 2013; Breznitz and 
Murphree 2011; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014; Butollo 2013). Part of this 
literature expresses the concern that (1) China’s value chain integra-
tion into today’s globalised, highly deverticalised supply chains 
through cost-cutting manufacturing is shallow (Steinfeld 2004: 1971; 
Ge and Fujimoto 2004: 23; Butollo 2013) and (2) there are limits to 
long-term Chinese catch-up success when manufacturing is simply 
based on modularity and related outsourcing (Lee, Cho, and Jin 
2009). Another body of literature on so-called innovative manufactur-
ing (Nahm and Steinfeld 2014; Herrigel, Wittke, and Voskamp 2013; 
Herrigel 2010) consists of micro-processual studies on learning and 
upgrading which assert that China has “developed unique capabilities 
surrounding technology commercialization and manufacturing-related 
innovation” (Nahm and Steinfeld 2014). This allows for manufactur-
ing upgrading and learning to actively take place in China (Herrigel, 
Wittke, and Voskamp 2013) as well as the reconfiguration of Sino–
foreign customer–supplier relations in manufacturing (e.g. producing 
fragile sustained contingent relations as Chinese actors redefine their 
capabilities, roles, and positions) (Herrigel 2010).  
Regarding upgrading in China’s wind power sector, the literature 
primarily sees it as an issue of China’s rapid integration into GVCs 
and GPNs and also gradually into GINs and innovation systems (e.g. 
Silva and Klagge 2013; Klagge, Liu, and Silva 2012; Gosens and Lu 
2013; Chen et al. 2014; Lewis 2013; Lema, Berger, and Schmitz 2013; 
Nahm and Steinfeld 2014). GIN scholars, in particular, argue that 
China’s integration into GINs and innovation systems (Ernst 2006; 
Gu and Lundvall 2006) – or into the more or less interchangeable 
notion of international networks for learning and innovation (Lewis 
2013) and collaborative innovation networks (Chen et al. 2014) – has 
played a rarely examined but crucial role in the development of its 
wind industry (Lewis 2013; Silva and Klagge 2013). This literature 
illustrates how traditional technology transfer mechanisms (e.g. FDI, 
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trade, and licensing) have shifted over time to non-traditional mecha-
nisms of mutual learning such as joint design, research and develop-
ment (R&D) collaboration, and overseas R&D units (Lema, Berger, 
and Schmitz 2013; Lewis 2013; Kirkegaard 2015). 
China’s Institutional Specificities: Accounts of Chinese 
Catch-Up and Experimentalism 
Despite the many valuable insights it provides into upgrading pro-
cesses, the upgrading literature only takes institutional contexts into 
account to a limited extent. This paper, however, is informed by the 
view that it is vital to consider China’s specific institutional context 
and status as a newly industrialised “developmental” state in order to 
understand the upgrading of China’s wind turbine industry and the 
deconfiguration and reconfiguration of Sino–foreign relations.  
The developmental state literature does this, offering rich in-
sights into how newly industrialised countries have succeeded in 
catching up with developed countries. For example, it illustrates how 
the miraculous growth of the Southeast Asian tigers during the 1970s 
and 1980s was enabled through extensive state intervention and those 
developmental states’ strategic, longer-term policy focus (e.g. Evans 
1995; Wade 2004; Amsden 2004; Johnson 1995; Kim 1997; Chen and 
Lees 2016; Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991; Hobday 1995; Mathews 
and Cho 2007; Ang 2016; Angel and Rock 2009). Moreover, devel-
opmental state literature discusses a state’s ability not only to catch up 
with developed countries but also to leapfrog them and move faster 
towards a sustainable transition through its ability to harness:  
global economic forces for technological and sustainability transi-
tions through an openness to trade and investment and effective 
public–private institutions able to link cleaner technologies and 
environmental standards to production activities in firms. (Rock et 
al. 2009: 241)  
China, however, constitutes a “socialist developmental state” (Gore 
2014: 302), and some scholars argue that the country’s establishment 
of a renewable energy industry is driven by its desire to upgrade and 
catch up with developed economies rather than by environmental 
concerns (Chen and Lees 2016; Mathews and Tan 2015).  
In relevant strands of the political economy literature that com-
pare China’s institutional political economy with those of other na-
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tions, many authors classify China’s “variety of capitalism” as a “hy-
brid” between “liberal market economies” or “coordinated market 
economies” (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; McNally 2013). This is large-
ly due to the way in which China’s state-permeated capitalism 
(McNally 2013; Ten Brink 2013) – which is marked by a socialist, 
authoritarian, and state-centric yet fragmented mode of governance – 
has become a puzzle for “ideal type” theorization based on the varie-
ties of capitalism dichotomy, whereby China is confined to a “variety 
of capitalism with Chinese characteristics” (Peck and Zhang 2013). 
Whereas the varieties of capitalism literature argues that institutional 
comparative advantage stems from complementarity between institu-
tions, Chinese institutions often do not add up or reflect complemen-
tarity but rather different forms of capitalism – a phenomenon re-
ferred to as “variegated capitalism” (e.g. Peck and Zhang 2013; Peck 
and Theodore 2007). The concept of variegated capitalism illustrates 
how China’s lack of complementarity can be a productive force for 
transformation and development (Peck and Zhang 2013; Peck and 
Theodore 2007).  
The variegated capitalism literature has links to China studies, 
which examines China from a Chinese perspective. The influential 
notion of fragmented authoritarianism (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988; Lieberthal 2004: 187) explains how Chinese development is 
marked by “both divergence and connection” and “directed improvisa-
tion” (Ang 2016: 66) and is thus a productive force of variety within 
China, which is fragmented and subdivided into “criss-crossing juris-
dictions” of vertical “lines” of bureaucracy (ᶑ, tiao) and horizontally 
coordinated “pieces” (ඇ, kuai) (i.e. bodies) at various levels. This 
means that despite being a strong authoritarian state, paradoxically, 
“much of China’s developmental initiatives take place at the local 
level by local states” (Gore 2014: 303). The fragmented nature of 
Chinese governance contributes to an unpredictability and ambiguity 
in the implementation of top-down policies at the local level (Brez-
nitz and Murphree 2011: 38; Korsnes 2016; Ang 2016); others refer 
to it as “structured uncertainty” (Breznitz and Murphree 2011) or 
“experimentation under hierarchy” (Heilmann 2008: 29). According 
to Ang (2016), China has experienced rapid yet disruptive and non-
linear economic development by exploiting its weak non-consistent 
institutions, enabling development to take place through a co-evolu-
tionary process of mutual adjustment between markets and local and 
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central government. Last, these institutional traits have been linked to 
a particular governance mode of Chinese experimentalism, pragma-
tism, flexibility, adaptability, and creativity (Ang 2016; Korsnes 2014; 
Heilmann 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; Breznitz and Murphree 2011) in 
which the central “direction underscores the role of top-down plan-
ning,” whilst local improvisation “champions the merits of bottom-
up initiative” (Ang 2016: 69).  
Pragmatic Governance in the Electrical Power and 
Wind Power Sectors 
Observers have drawn on the developmental state literature to ex-
plain the growth of China’s renewables sector – the design and im-
plementation of which is marked by top-down command and control 
strategies and a long-term focus on building industrial and technolog-
ical capacity (Chen and Lees 2016; Angel and Rock 2009; Mathews 
and Tan 2015). In turn, the very notion of “fragmented authoritarian-
ism” was coined in a study of China’s state-owned and state-controllled 
power sector (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). Various studies have 
enquired further into the fragmented and pragmatic governance mode 
used to reform China’s power sector (e.g. García 2013; Meidan, An-
drews-Speed, and Xin 2009; Martinot 2010; Korsnes 2014; Chen and 
Lees 2016; Kirkegaard 2015, 2016, forthcoming). Further, in regard to 
the wind power market, Liu and Kokko illustrate how the Chinese 
state, through the extensive role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs): 
participates directly in the wind power sector in several ways by 
commissioning wind power projects, operating wind farms, and 
producing equipment for the wind power industry. (Liu and Kok-
ko 2010: 5523)  
Whereas coordination has been important for the growth of China’s 
wind industry (Lema and Ruby 2007), China’s wind turbine industry 
has been driven by the government’s oscillation between centralisa-
tion and decentralisation, on the one hand, and between centralised 
ambitious visions and ambiguity in regard to local implementation, on 
the other (Korsnes 2014, 2016).  
The literature on industrial upgrading and institutional accounts 
of catch-up provide valuable insights into institutional context, which 
aids our understanding of China’s wind power market. In addition, 
like Ang (2016), I argue that the recent move in the literature towards 
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“localized, adaptive approaches in the development field is extremely 
promising” and needs further exploration “to learn more about the 
ways of combining direction and improvisation” and non-linearity in 
development (Ang 2016: 69).  
This paper enquires into the potentially distinct Chinese mode of 
non-linear and disruptive upgrading by offering a dynamic processual 
account which does not assume that relations, roles, and positions are 
stable. By doing so, this paper seeks to go even further – namely, by 
providing a multilevel account. This account relates the meso-level 
historical account of the Chinese wind turbine industry to the reshuf-
fling of Sino–foreign relations at the micro level and puts these in 
China’s institutional context as a developmental state with the para-
doxical characteristics of central planning and local experimentation. 
Even though experimental policy learning has generally been linked 
to China’s innovation performance (Gu and Lundvall 2006; Breznitz 
and Murphree 2011; Heilmann 2010), no studies have linked the dis-
tinct phases of Chinese industrial upgrading (meso level) to either the 
deconfiguration and reconfiguration of Sino–foreign relations (micro 
level) or their institutional embeddedness in the Chinese political 
economy of experimentalist pragmatism (macro level). Doing so can 
help us to detect whether there is a unique Chinese model of disrup-
tive, non-linear upgrading.  
Method
Building on extant literature, the study provides a historical and 
somewhat schematic and simplified account of three different distinct 
phases in the Chinese wind power market: (i) the late 1980s–2002, (ii) 
2003–2011, and (iii) 2012–present. Although these rather simplified 
phases somewhat overlap, they are all identifiable through having 
been disrupted by radical government intervention; in the last two 
phases intervention occurred following the realisation of self-disrup-
tive limitations of the previous phase. On this basis, the present paper 
seeks to provide the foundation for a broader discussion of China’s 
potentially unique (un)logic of non-linear upgrading and shed light on 
the changing quality of governance relations between Chinese and 
foreign customers (wind turbine manufacturers) and component 
suppliers over time.  
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To ensure an empirically rich account, this paper uses an exten-
sive amount of primary and secondary data. The primary data con-
sists of findings from 98 semi-structured interviews conducted during 
doctoral fieldwork primarily in China and, to a lesser extent, in Den-
mark and Germany. The interviews were carried out in Chinese, Eng-
lish, or Danish between 2011 and 2013. Follow-up interviews were 
conducted in each country in both 2015 and 2016. The secondary 
data stems from a substantial review of news, policies and five-year 
plans, industry reports, and participation at wind energy events in 
China since 2011. To ensure a multilevel approach, I conducted in-
terviews with wind turbine manufacturers, component suppliers, 
universities and research institutes, industry associations, relevant 
ministries, the China State Grid Corporation, design and consulting 
companies, renewable energy think tanks, certification bodies, test 
laboratories, and finance institutions. Whenever possible, I carried 
out company interviews with innovation managers, R&D directors, 
R&D engineers and/or chief engineers, directors, general managers, 
vice presidents, chief executive officers, managing directors, policy 
advisors, technical experts and scientists, international business man-
agers, sales managers, or chief strategists. The interviews took be-
tween 30 minutes and three hours.  
Due to the need to develop personal relations (ޣ㌫, guanxi) to 
establish contact with potential respondents, I adopted snowball 
sampling for data collection. Being able to both write emails and 
conduct interviews in Chinese (Mandarin) helped me considerably to 
gain access to informants and establish trust with respondents. Most 
of the primary data were transcribed, translated if necessary, and cod-
ed in order to detect themes and to provide a basis for a historical 
outline. Throughout the paper, a few key quotes from central actors 
are used to qualify the core narrative. However, I have maintained 
these actors anonymity, which is a highly sensitive and prevalent issue 
in the area of fieldwork in China (Heimer and Thøgersen 2006).  
Rapid Upgrading in China’s Wind Turbine  
Industry through Self-Disruptive Moves 
In the following section the paper identifies three distinct phases 
which have all led to stages of impasse in China’s wind turbine indus-
try. In turn, these stages of self-inflicted disruption have necessitated 
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radical interventions by the Chinese government, which have radically 
redefined roles, reconfigured governance relations, and, ultimately, 
resulted in disruptive moves of rapid upgrading. 
Phase One (Late 1980s–2002): The Ascendance of 
China’s Original Equipment Manufacturers
China has experimented with grid-connected wind turbines since the 
1980s. Initially, wind power investment primarily consisted of scien-
tific research or state demonstration projects without commercialisa-
tion (Zhao, Wang, and Wang 2012; Lema and Ruby 2007). From the 
early 1990s, efforts at building a wind turbine manufacturing industry 
became slightly more coordinated. The Ride the Wind Programme 
(1996), for example, constituted part of China’s so-called technology-
for-market-access or trade-market-access-for-technology policy. It was 
meant to attract foreign companies to the Chinese market and en-
courage domestic manufacturers to cooperate with foreign manufac-
turers that had localised in China by means of technology transfer 
and had formed Sino–foreign joint ventures (Klagge, Liu, and Silva 
2012). Overall, the attraction of foreign technologies, know-how, and 
technology acquisition (e.g. through reverse engineering and back-
ward design of foreign design licences) was critical to the construc-
tion of China’s nascent wind turbine industry (Cherni and Kentish 
2007; Lewis and Wiser 2007; Lewis 2007, 2013; Klagge, Liu, and Silva 
2012; Lema and Ruby 2007; Li 2010; Korsnes 2014; Lema, Berger, 
and Schmitz 2013; Chen et al. 2014; Silva and Klagge 2013). Yet, 
even though China’s manufacturing base started to emerge, phase 
one of China’s wind power market (late 1980s–2002) was marked by 
piecemeal, incremental experimentation and indeterminacy as to 
whether or not to build up a domestic industrial chain or rely on 
turbine imports instead (Lema and Ruby 2007). Consequently, the 
development of China’s wind power sector was a relatively slow, 
step-by-step process marked by extensive fragmentation of authority 
between different bureaucracies and across national and local levels 
(Lema and Ruby 2007; Liu and Kokko 2010).  
Phase One Impasse: Limitations of Technology Transfer 
During phase one, China succeeded in attracting foreign technolo-
gies. Nevertheless, China’s wind turbine industry had some inbuilt 
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self-limitations, which led to inertia. First and foremost, the market 
was still dominated by foreign wind turbine manufacturers, and 
emerging Chinese wind turbine manufacturers largely functioned as 
assembly manufacturers without indigenous design capabilities. These 
assembly OEMs can be said to have followed a “Lego approach” – 
that is, they relied on foreign design licences and bought and assem-
bled the different parts on design licences’ component lists without 
having to worry about the systemic interplay of the many different 
turbine parts. Apart from lacking a systemic overview, the lack of a 
domestic supply chain also meant that Chinese assembly companies 
were dependent on relatively expensive foreign components (Haa-
konsson and Kirkegaard 2016). Once the Chinese government rec-
ognised the need to build up a domestic supply chain to reduce de-
pendence on expensive foreign components and decided to develop a 
more coherent and coordinated policy for the wind power sector, and 
once the Chinese industrial base had acquired experience and had 
developed higher ambitions, phase one came to an end (Liu and 
Kokko 2010; Lema and Ruby 2007; Korsnes 2014). This shift took 
place around 2002 when a major reform of China’s power sector was 
introduced, leading to the unbundling of power generation from 
transmission. Furthermore, the delegation to the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) of responsibility for coordi-
nating supply and demand for wind power signalled the beginning of 
a new era in China’s wind power market (Yu et al. 2009; García 2013; 
Liu and Kokko 2010; Lema and Ruby 2007).  
Phase Two (2003–2011): China’s “Turbine Wave
Attack”
Having realised the continued self-limiting dependency on foreign 
technologies and having become determined to build a homegrown 
industry, the Chinese government encouraged the Chinese wind tur-
bine manufacturing industry to build up a domestic supply chain and 
expand wind power capacity. Along with the power sector reform, 
the government interventions outlined below should be seen in the 
context of the introduction of the Chinese Communist Party’s doc-
trine of “Scientific Development” (2003) and its key means of “indi-
genous innovation” (Christensen 2013), which marked a general shift 
in focus from importing technologies to spurring local innovation 
and upgrading.  
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First and foremost, wind farm concessions and wind tender pro-
grammes, which were introduced in 2003 and ran until 2009, helped 
stimulate the development of large-scale wind farm development in 
China, which had a guaranteed grid-connection tariff determined by a 
national-level tendering process and focus on lowest-priced bids (Li 
2010: 1159). In the government-led tender system, wind farm devel-
opers were invited by the NDRC to bid for sites that had been chosen 
by the government and assessed for good wind resources. Before 
2009, tenders for wind power construction projects had to meet a 
localisation rate of 70 per cent, which forced foreign manufacturers 
to establish themselves in the Chinese market. Overall, the conces-
sion programme marked a shift towards the centralised, large-scale 
commercialisation of wind farms and transformed Sino–foreign busi-
ness relations, as foreign wind turbine manufacturers (and their com-
ponent suppliers) had been attracted to China through preferential 
treatment during phase one. Meanwhile, the concession programme 
introduced evaluation criteria which favoured domestic state-owned 
wind farm developers, and lowest-bid prioritisation often meant that 
foreign manufacturers were unable to win bids (Lewis 2013: 82; Chen 
and Lees 2016: 578). Second, the influential 2005 Renewable Energy 
Law and several five-year plans resulted in the rapid growth in in-
stalled wind power capacity, in manufacturing upscaling, and in the 
large-scale commercialisation of wind farms (Li 2010; Korsnes 2014; 
Klagge, Liu, and Silva 2012; Lema and Ruby 2007). Third, wind farm 
planning was fragmented and often decentralised during phase two, 
leading to head-on provincial competition for the largest installed 
capacity, which soon led to overheated investments. 
As wind turbine manufacturers and component suppliers fol-
lowed the signals from the Chinese government to establish a Chi-
nese wind power market, and as provincial governments strived to 
meet the ambitious targets of installed capacity, investments from 
power-generating companies increased quickly and dramatically, lead-
ing to the rapid growth of the wind turbine industry. For instance, in 
1998 Goldwind was the only Chinese wind turbine manufacturer; in 
2005 there were still only a couple. By the end of 2008, however, the 
number of Chinese wind turbine manufacturers exceeded 70, and the 
number of component suppliers – this included manufacturers of 
blades, converters, control systems, bearings, and gearboxes (Li 2010: 
1159) – was in the hundreds (García 2013: 137–138; Yu, Zhang, and 
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Chen 2009: 5222). By utilising mature technology through licensing 
and thus avoiding high R&D expenditures, Chinese turbine manufac-
turers were soon able “to produce turbines at much lower costs than 
their foreign counterparts” (Klagge, Liu, and Silva 2012: 376). 
Phase Two Impasse: The Creation of a “Quality Crisis” 
The emphasis during phase two was on building a domestic supply 
chain. The chosen strategy was successful as China’s wind turbine 
manufacturing industry soon became more mature and covered the 
entire supply chain. This was enabled through a relentless focus on 
quantitative upscaling and a licensing strategy that enabled China’s 
domestic enterprises to move “quickly up the technological ladder,” 
winning “local market share and, as the sector matured, [strengthen] 
global competitiveness” (Chen and Lees 2016: 578). The growth in 
both the country’s industrial base and installed capacity was facilitated 
by, for example, (i) tendering processes for wind power development 
which favoured lowest bids and largely disregarded quality measures, 
(ii) decentralised wind farm planning, (iii) a focus on installed capacity 
over generated electricity, (iv) and a lack of certification criteria. Addi-
tionally, the quantitative targets of various development plans only 
concentrated on installed capacity measured in gigawatts (GW) rather 
than on actual generated-electricity targets (such as gigawatt hours, 
GWh). According to one foreign scientist,  
back then, the only thing that mattered, and the only thing really 
demanded in the Renewable Energy Law, was just megawatts […] 
how many megawatts could be installed. Whether the turbine 
would run, they didn’t care. It was all about capacity [measured in 
gigawatts] and nothing about productivity [measured in gigawatt 
hours]. (Anonymous 1 2013)  
This basically meant that Chinese wind turbine manufacturers and 
wind farm developers did not need to bother themselves with ensur-
ing that their turbines could actually provide stable and optimal out-
put or be connected to the power grid. Moreover, along with largely 
pursuing the “Lego approach” of phase one and not meeting any 
certification requirements, Chinese component suppliers and turbine 
manufacturers without any prior experience were allowed to enter the 
market and outcompete Western manufacturers. In addition, through 
extensive fragmentation and decentralisation of wind power planning, 
local provinces competed for the largest installed capacity rather than 
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ensuring grid integration. Last, the financial support scheme during 
this period was unable to cover the costs of developing wind power. 
This basically only left space for China’s state-owned companies, 
which – given their soft budget constraints – could more easily bear 
the burden of debt and low profits (Zhao, Wang, and Wang 2012; 
García 2013; Korsnes 2014; Li 2010; Liu and Kokko 2010; Yu, 
Zhang, and Chen 2009). 
Although the growth strategy had proved successful, phase two 
soon faced an impasse: the industry was marked by overcapacity, high 
curtailment rates, quality issues (e.g. blade and shaft fractures, genera-
tor fires, and gearbox or brake failures), and low-capacity factors 
(García 2013; Li 2010; Cherni and Kentish 2007; Klagge, Liu, and 
Silva 2012; Kirkegaard 2015): 
By late 2010 there were visible flaws in China’s wind power indus-
try. The first was the production quality of the turbines. Since the 
government planners demanded quantity, and not performance, 
wind farm developers tended to cut corners. Thousands of Chi-
na’s turbines lack the more expensive technology that keeps them 
operating when there is a disturbance on the power grid. (Riley 
and Ashley 2012)  
Having allowed the installation of “gigawatt by gigawatt of very poor 
quality,” “massive quality problems” and “massive grid break downs” 
started to emerge (Anonymous 2 2012). Overall, China had upscaled 
with tremendous pace, both in the wind turbine manufacturing and 
component manufacturing industries. This was largely as the result of 
extensive price competition and a strategy of reverse engineering of 
foreign technology. Yet, such rapid industrial growth came with a 
price (Korsnes 2015: 75), bringing about what has been coined as a 
largely self-induced “quality crisis.” This quality crisis, in turn, soon 
threatened to undermine the survival of the entire market, as the 
wind power industry’s legitimacy as a “sustainable” energy source was 
called into question (Kirkegaard 2015, forthcoming).  
In this way, phase two also entailed disruptive self-limitations, 
which produced a second stage of impasse. In turn, the quality crisis 
in China’s wind power sector began to transform Sino–foreign rela-
tions: foreign wind turbine manufacturers and component suppliers 
struggled or even failed to survive in the market during the period of 
cutthroat competition. Today, the top 10 wind turbine manufacturers 
in the Chinese market are all Chinese (GWEC 2016: 32). Foreign 
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component suppliers soon had trouble keeping their Chinese cus-
tomers, as the Chinese wind turbine manufacturers – who through 
the “Lego approach” appeared to function purely as “assembly origi-
nal equipment manufacturers,” – started to source from the Chinese 
supply chain, which offered much lower prices; this, therefore, left 
Sino–foreign customer–supplier relations highly volatile (Kirkegaard 
2015).  
Phase Three (2012–Present): A Flexible “Turn to  
Quality”?
To contain the quality issues in the Chinese wind turbine industry and 
embark on a consolidation phase, the Chinese government employed 
a variety of new radical interventions after 2012 – namely, policies, 
plans, standards, targets, and regulations. This marks the central gov-
ernment’s attempt to ensure a “turn to quality” (Kirkegaard 2015). 
According to one interviewee,  
Beijing needs to take control [by] putting in standards and re-
quirements for a higher quality. Standards and requirements for 
[things] other than just installing gigawatts into the ground. (Ano-
nymous 2 2012) 
Now the second wave [of a quality focus] is coming [after the first 
wave of rapid industrial growth in installed capacity], now that 
they [the Chinese government] have realised that it [wind turbines] 
may not be the best quality. (Anonymous 3 2012) 
This indicates there has been a political reorientation towards central-
ised control from extensive decentralisation and fragmented coordi-
nation. Below, I discuss six key interventions used by the Chinese 
government to create the conditions for a “turn to quality” in the 
wind turbine manufacturing sector. 
First, the central government sought to raise quality and over-
come the relative backwardness in technologies by introducing indus-
trial and technical standards. As early as 2010, the Ministry of Indus-
try and Information Technology (MIIT) had – amongst other things – 
released a draft circular on access standards for the wind power 
equipment manufacturing industry, which aimed to:  
promote the optimization and upgrading of the industrial struc-
ture of the wind power equipment manufacturing industry, en-
hance enterprises’ technical innovation, improve product quality, 
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[and] restrict the introduction of redundant technology [to] guide 
the industry’s healthy development. (MIIT cited in Lewis 2013: 
57) 
In addition, the wind power industry was listed under “encouraged 
development” in the NDRC’s 2011 “Guideline Catalogue for Indus-
trial Restructuring,” which made wind power eligible for preferential 
treatment due to its status as a “strategic” modern pillar industry 
(Chen and Lees 2016: 581). However, these preferential policies were 
not extended to companies that produced wind turbines with a 2.5 
megawatt (MW) capacity or lower. In practice, this excluded inexperi-
enced wind turbine manufacturers from the market. Furthermore, the 
National Energy Administration issued 18 new technical standards in 
2011 to improve the regulation of technology development in the 
wind sector and grid connection (Lewis 2013: 58, 74). Overall, these 
new certification requirements initiated a consolidation phase as no 
more than 10 of China’s estimated 80 wind turbine manufacturers 
were able to meet the certification requirements and new standards 
(People’s Daily Online 2011). 
Second, the Chinese government gradually shifted its plans and 
policy instruments, moving from purely focusing on capacity installa-
tions (GW) towards ensuring generated electricity (GWh). This was 
achieved through introducing both supply- and demand-related 
schemes, such as mandatory market shares (Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance 2012: 2), experimentation with national renewable energy 
portfolio standards, power purchase agreements, and cost-sharing 
schemes – all of which should ensure that grid companies, generating 
companies, and provinces fulfil their obligations to generate, distrib-
ute, transmit, and buy wind power (Lema and Ruby 2007; Lewis 
2007; García 2013; Liu and Kokko 2010; Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance 2012; Cherni and Kentish 2007). As investors, wind power 
developers, and producers were now to be rewarded only for actual 
generated electricity rather than installed capacity, stricter require-
ments were introduced to ensure that wind turbines were capable of 
delivering controllable optimal outputs (Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance 2012; Kirkegaard 2015). This constituted a new critical incen-
tive measure for raising turbine quality (Yu, Zhang, and Chen 2009; 
Gosens and Lu 2013; Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2012; Kirke-
gaard 2015).  
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Third, the government also changed its price-setting model and 
began to increasingly concentrate on quality by, inter alia, (i) gradually 
changing the focus of China’s concession projects from competitive 
bidding towards other quality-related criteria (Korsnes 2014; García 
2013: 130) and (ii) pragmatically experimenting with proper levels for 
the support scheme (Zhao, Wang, and Wang 2012; García 2013; 
Korsnes 2014). 
Fourth, the Chinese government decided to increase its central-
ised control over wind power development by requiring national-level 
approval for large wind farm projects. This move was intended to 
counter overheated investment activities at the local provincial level 
(Yu, Zhang, and Chen 2009; García 2013; Korsnes 2014; Kirkegaard 
2015) and proved central to the turn to quality. 
Fifth, the government and the CPC began to allow the largely 
state-controlled media to highlight quality issues regarding wind tur-
bines. Because the media in China can serve to either legitimise or 
delegitimise the wind turbine industry (Korsnes 2014: 188–189), this 
can be seen as a measure designed to steer growth in the Chinese 
wind power sector as stories about the quality and poor functioning of 
wind turbines only started to surface in 2011 despite such issues hav-
ing emerged prior to the downturn in 2011 (Korsnes 2014: 188–189).  
Finally, the State Council issued its twelfth “Five-Year Plan for 
the Scientific and Technological Development of Wind Power” in 
2012, which constituted the first plan devoted to the scientific (and 
sustainable) development of wind power. Proclaiming its guiding 
ideology to be the doctrine of “scientific development,” the plan 
emphasises the need to upgrade Chinese indigenous innovation cap-
abilities within core technologies, particularly in the areas of control 
system and simulation tool software and basic research into mathe-
matics, aerodynamics, and certification and standardisation.  
On the whole, these interventions – along with a break on fa-
vourable government loans to investors – helped to steer the industry 
towards a more quality- and innovation-focused track and facilitated 
the emergence of Chinese OEMs in the wind power industry. Today, 
Chinese OEMs compete against foreign competitors on more equal 
terms, and some are now brand manufacturers, such as Goldwind 
and Envision – both of which have successfully engaged in Sino–
foreign mutual learning. In this respect, Chinese OEMs are increas-
ingly adopting the role as active system co-players. This can be seen 
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in how they integrate into emerging global innovation networks (Silva 
and Klagge 2013); file for patents; participate in standard formulation 
with research institutes and Chinese certification bodies; and even 
engage in the mergers and acquisitions of Western design firms, in 
outward FDI (e.g. by establishing innovation centres abroad), and in 
collaborative design and co-development (Lema, Berger, and Schmitz 
2013; Lewis 2013; Klagge, Liu, and Silva 2012; Li 2010; Silva and 
Klagge 2013; Chen et al. 2014; Kirkegaard 2015). 
Imminent Phase Three Impasse? Competition over Core 
Technologies and Fragile Relations 
The radical government interventions outlined above enabled China’s 
wind power industry to reach a consolidation phase around 2011–
2012, which is reflected by the slowing installed capacity growth rate 
and the decreasing number of wind turbine manufacturers. As a con-
sequence, it is projected that a maximum of only five Chinese wind 
turbine manufacturers will survive in the market. Indeed, when the 
Chinese central government makes a decision, it can trigger “seismic 
changes across the country” (Ang 2016: 73). According to various 
industry actors, this has long been the underlying strategy of the gov-
ernment to enforce a shake-out in the wind power market and has 
allowed dozens of actors to compete and push prices down. As ex-
pressed by a foreign wind power scientist: 
They [the Chinese] have had a lot of different agendas along the 
way. Well, they also had an industrial policy agenda, and that was 
very obvious, and they didn’t conceal that either. Wind power de-
velopment – that was industrial policy. In the beginning, it was 
about building an industry. And then within a number of years, 
China was meant to become competitive. Chinese industry experts 
were predicting that, within a certain number of years, based on 
the industrial base, China would be able to produce quality wind 
turbines. But quality was not the first step. That was not the im-
portant thing in the beginning. The most important was to make 
the industry […] let them try out producing turbines. (Anonymous 
1 2013) 
Overall, the development and progression of different phases illus-
trate an oscillating movement between planning and experimentation, 
on the one hand, and between centralised, coordinated control and 
decentralised fragmentation (characteristic of Chinese fragmented 
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authoritarianism), on the other (Korsnes 2014; Kirkegaard 2015). 
China’s OEMs upgraded in a non-linear and disruptive fashion dur-
ing the iterative phases of impasse following the radical interventions 
of the Chinese government. To ensure quality and to build innova-
tion capacity, Chinese wind turbine manufacturers are currently ex-
perimenting with internalising the design, development, and manufac-
turing of turbine core components, rather than relying on outsourced 
components (Haakonsson and Kirkegaard 2016). This is transform-
ing relations between Chinese and foreign actors. As Chinese actors 
struggle to build indigenous innovation capabilities in critical core 
technologies, Sino–foreign relations have become increasingly con-
tested during the turn to quality. For instance, Chinese manufacturers 
have already upgraded in the production of hardware parts for the 
main control systems of turbines, and the majority are increasingly 
experimenting with and capable of developing their own software 
tools. However, they often still remain dependent on foreign software 
tools for core algorithmic parts and when developing indigenous 
turbine designs. These core parts of the software are often black-
boxed, however, through encryption devices and other means. At the 
same time, Chinese capabilities and ambitions to improve the quality 
of indigenous innovation have risen. These dynamics have produced 
power struggles around core technologies between Chinese and for-
eign actors. As such, technologies are critical for realising the Chinese 
wind power industry’s “turn to quality” and ability to catch-up and 
align with China’s official scientific development vision through in-
digenous innovation. Fearing the loss of their Chinese customers, 
some foreign control system suppliers have consequently started to 
experiment with opening up selected source codes and/or modularis-
ing specific algorithms in order to satisfy their customers’ new re-
quirements (Kirkegaard 2015).  
With the turn to quality taking place, Chinese actors are upgrad-
ing in a non-linear fashion, thus reconfiguring Sino–foreign relations. 
This implies that Sino–foreign supply chain relations have become 
fragile and volatile, characterised by simultaneous competition and 
collaboration (Kirkegaard 2015; Kirkegaard forthcoming). Indeed, 
that being witnessed may be termed the emergence of sustained con-
tingent relations (Herrigel 2010), where roles and positions as well as 
goals and aims are constantly being renegotiated. Last, phase three 
may run into a third stage of stagnation and impasse as a result both 
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of these contested relations and of the future need for Chinese actors 
to invest more in basic research and applied core mathematics. Des-
pite this, China’s wind turbine industry has succeeded in non-linear 
upgrading through pragmatic and experimental governance – that is, 
through iterative moves of recentralisation and reintervention as well 
as through a developmental state logic to transfer and adapt the best 
available foreign technology whilst actively protecting China’s domes-
tic industry (Chen and Lees 2016: 578, 582). 
Discussion: China’s Rapid Upgrading through 
Self-Inflicted Stages of Impasse 
The above analysis has identified three distinct phases in the trajec-
tory of Chinese wind power development. Each phase was marked by 
rapid moves of upscaling and upgrading. At the same time, each 
phase reached a certain stage of impasse. Phase one led to the exten-
sive dependence of Chinese manufacturers on foreign suppliers and 
their expensive products. Phase two resulted in a Chinese quality 
crisis and limitations of the assembly approach. Phase three culminat-
ed in the potentially disruptive nature of imminent power struggles 
between Chinese and foreign players during the turn to quality.  
The self-inflicted stages of potentially self-disrupting impasse 
were the result of the Chinese government’s fluctuation between 
radical intervention and a lack of intervention. Consequently, the 
repeated phases of impasse and radical government intervention have 
resulted in the constant deconfiguration and reconfiguration of Sino–
foreign relations in the wind turbine industry. In phase one Chinese 
assembly manufacturers relied heavily on foreign technology and 
components, leaving foreign wind turbine manufacturers in a relative-
ly favourable position. During phase two, cutthroat price competition 
made it virtually impossible for foreign manufacturers and suppliers 
to sell their products, while rapid development led to unstable rela-
tions between Chinese and foreign actors. This saw foreign suppliers 
lose many Chinese customers, and foreign turbine manufacturers lost 
many bids. In phase three, Sino–foreign relations are being reconfig-
ured as Chinese manufacturers now focus increasingly on quality, 
which leaves more space in the Chinese market for foreign actors/ 
manufacturers – who still generally provide higher quality. Mean-
while, the new enhanced focus on quality and the critical role of core 
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technologies has made some Sino-foreign relations more volatile and 
more fragile. Nevertheless, as Chinese companies catch up, the tradi-
tional technology transfer mode of licensing is gradually being over-
taken by more equal partnerships, mutual learning, and cooperative 
innovation. This has enabled Chinese actors to redefine themselves 
and their mutual relations through constantly engaging in transforma-
tive reconfigurative games (Kirkegaard 2015) and “breaking down” 
otherwise path-dependent and often deterministic accounts of value 
chain upgrading and constraining governance structures. 
In contrast to the findings of most of the extant literature, indus-
trial upgrading in the Chinese wind power sector does not seem to 
follow a linear trajectory. Rather, China has pursued a non-linear and 
disruptive trajectory in which a series of impasses have been con-
structed, led to radical government interventions, and forced Chinese 
companies to find flexible solutions for creative upgrading. After 
each disruption, China’s wind turbine industry seems to have found 
new routes by flexibly and pragmatically responding to the earlier 
“mistakes,” thereby creating ever higher development goals. This 
Chinese-style trajectory further illustrates how China’s leadership has 
sometimes allowed stages of impasse to take place with the deliberate 
aim of learning from them. According to one Chinese industry expert 
and government advisor, the reasons for and the pragmatic handling 
of the quality crisis in the Chinese wind power sector is linked to the 
way in which problems “force us to have the solutions. This is good” 
(Anonymous 4 2013). Thus, China has been using a “first do, then 
solve” approach (ݸڊˈ᡽䀓ߣ, Xian zuo, cai jiejue!): 
If the problem had not appeared, nobody would have considered 
it. […] That is not a strategy […] that is a […] reality. To learn 
from the practice is much better than to learn from the theory or 
learn from imagination […] It’s the Chinese way. (Anonymous 4 
2013) 
In this “Chinese way” – which may be termed a pragmatic crisis-and-
response development model – what would normally be regarded as 
“mistakes” are not necessarily negative, because they force actors to 
experiment and creatively find solutions. Therefore, the fragmented 
Chinese governance of the wind power sector has resulted in disrup-
tive upgrading, which sometimes brings about “inherent tensions” 
that require “state responses to these tensions” (Ang 2016: 68). The 
iterative stages of impasse have been pragmatically allowed as they are 
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seen as potential conduits of learning from experimentation. In such 
a context, the constant readjustment of failures, upgrading, experi-
mentation, expectations, and imaginaries are fine-tuned and consti-
tute Chinese “arts of the state” or Chinafication, whereby innovation 
and quality are made to fit the (Chinese) agenda (Korsnes 2014). To 
some extent, this aligns with Ang’s (2016) notion that China has en-
abled economic development by exploiting and learning from its 
weak and fragmented institutions, which has resulted in non-linear 
development. Indeed, the story of Chinese wind power is one of non-
linear trial and error and the “volatile yet productive combination of 
decentralized experimentation with ad hoc central interference” 
(Heilmann 2008: 29).  
In this way, the paper has illustrated the importance of under-
standing China’s upgrading in the wind power sector within a Chi-
nese institutional context. More specifically, I have argued that Chi-
na’s non-linear disruptive upgrading in wind power would not have 
been possible without the ingenuity and pragmatism of Chinese gov-
ernance or its nature of structured uncertainty. Even though “dir-
ected improvisation” (Ang 2016) may seem a “contradiction in 
terms” at first sight (Ang 2016: 69), it makes sense to dismantle the 
dichotomy and look at how direction and improvisation coexist in the 
case of China’s development. Doing so enables us to see that China 
seems to have achieved rapid and disruptive upgrading through adap-
tive pragmatism and experimentalism. This paper hereby aligns with 
both Korsnes (2014), who points to the importance of China’s policy 
flexibility and navigational skills in nurturing its wind turbine indus-
try, and Heilmann (2008: 18), who argues that China’s governance 
mode is “guided by intentional anticipation instead of blind trial and 
error.” Yet, at the same time, this paper contributes to the literature a 
dynamic and multilevel accounts of the constant reshuffling of Sino–
foreign relations within China’s changing institutional context and of 
the process of disruptive upgrading. Indeed, the long-term sustain-
ability of China’s fragmented governance mode is still up for discus-
sion (e.g. Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014; 
Rock and Toman 2015; Liu and Liang 2013: 486) – for instance, 
overcapacity seems to be a common Chinese problem in several in-
dustries (Rock and Toman 2015). Whilst it can be claimed that the 
quality crisis ran the risk of delegitimising the wind power market and 
even China’s experimental and fragmented governance mode in gen-
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eral, it is necessary to enquire further into other strategic industries in 
China and to detect whether similar disruptive movements of non-
linear upgrading can be detected. This is an exciting area for future 
research. In fact, it may be claimed that other renewable energies are 
prone to such non-linear upgrading due to the strategic roles of those 
sectors and the way in which renewables, by their nature, disrupt 
China’s fossil fuel–based power sector. To make China an emerging 
“global green leader,” the Chinese government must employ disrup-
tive moves to unlock the country from its trajectory as a coal king-
dom.  
Last, there is a need to enquire into the extent to which China is 
adopting a “specifically Chinese” non-linear upgrading model or 
merely emulating the experience of other developmental states (Liu 
and Liang 2013; Gore 2014; Chen and Lees 2016; Shen 2016). To 
some degree, it may be argued that Japanese companies experienced 
similar development during the 1960s and 1970s, when quality crises 
prompted policy adjustments and government responses. Further, it 
has been argued that the central role of the Chinese state “as ultimate 
pilot, coordinator and agent of change” is pragmatically modelled on 
the prior “successful development experiences of Japan, Korea, Tai-
wan and Singapore” (Mathews and Tan 2015: 146). Yet, despite the 
similarities, the scale and pace with which China has upgraded makes 
Chinese experimental pragmatism unique. In addition to this, the 
competitive situation facing China is very different from those that 
faced Japan and other East Asian countries. The Southeast Asian 
tiger economies faced an era characterised by the vertical integration 
of companies. China, in contrast, is facing an era of vertical disinte-
gration due to the increased modularity of technologies (Nahm and 
Steinfeld 2014). Moreover, with the opening of China’s markets fol-
lowing its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Angel 
and Rock 2009), China is upgrading in a “transformed era” (Steinfeld 
2004: 1983) in which Chinese companies have to deal with new, more 
complex competitive pressures and networked forms of production 
(Nolan 2001; Steinfeld 2004; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014). Given this 
new context, blindly copying the strategies of the Southeast Asian 
tigers is unviable as Chinese companies are more constrained in terms 
of room for manoeuvre when it comes to traditional developmental, 
interventionist industrial policy (Nahm and Steinfeld 2014). Mean-
while, China has sought to distance itself from neoliberal economic 
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policies (Mathews and Tan 2015: 146) and now looks increasingly 
likely to set “a new standard for industrial development” with regard 
to green governance, which is already being emulated elsewhere 
(Mathews and Tan 2015: 11). In this sense, China is increasingly see-
ing itself as a “model for other developing countries” when it comes 
to ensuring energy security and industrial development in alignment 
with societal concerns over economic and environmental acceptabil-
ity (Mathews and Tan 2015: 146, 148).  
Conclusion: Redefining the Competitive Field 
and Increasing Mutual Learning 
This paper has enquired into some of the defining institutional condi-
tions of Chinese industrial upgrading, which can help explain China’s 
success in “jumping the ladder” – that is, breaking free from preexist-
ing relations and structures and finding new radical solutions for self-
transformation. 
By identifying three distinct phases of non-linear upgrading and 
subsequent stages of impasse and radical government intervention, 
this paper illustrates (i) how China has used experimentalism and 
pragmatic governance to tackle upgrading in the Chinese wind power 
industry, (ii) how this has impacted relations between Chinese and 
foreign actors in China’s wind turbine industry, and (iii) how China 
has used its fragmented and experimental governance to kick-start 
economic development. China did not necessarily intend for the 
problems and stages of impasse to occur, but they did not prevent 
them either. Instead, they used them as learning resources. The wind 
power sector’s embeddedness in a Chinese experimental and prag-
matic governance mode, which has roots in China’s institutional 
fragmented authoritarianism, can have both advantages and disad-
vantages. The gamble faced by the Chinese government is that frag-
mentation may eventually spin out of control and pose a risk to the 
legitimacy of the wind turbine industry and other green industries. 
The government’s “turn to quality” in response to the potentially self-
disruptive quality crisis in the Chinese wind power sector (which has 
been enabled through its pragmatic experimental and fragmented 
governance) has made non-linear upgrading possible. China’s crisis-
and-response development model has worked in practice so far but 
has had implications for Sino-foreign customer–supplier relations. 
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For instance, China’s new capabilities and rising ambitions have led 
to constant a renegotiation of relations. This has rendered relations 
and their governance highly volatile and has produced simultaneous 
forces of competition and collaboration.  
In conclusion, a unique Chinese mode of upgrading (or upgrad-
ing with Chinese characteristics) has taken place within the Chinese 
wind power sector. These Chinese characteristics are found in Chi-
na’s institutional settings and are marked by experimental and prag-
matic governance, the constant oscillation between centralisation and 
decentralisation, fragmented authoritarianism, and structured uncer-
tainty. By providing insights into how pragmatic governance and 
experimentalism has enabled Chinese upgrading, this paper has shed 
light on a hitherto overlooked piece of the puzzle that is China’s rap-
id catch-up in the wind power industry. 
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